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Managing  agricultural  demand  for  U.S.  agricultural  products  in
the  1980s  involves  at  least  two  issues:  the  likely  magnitude  of
interannual  fluctuations  in agricultural  production  and consumption
and  the  need  for  demand  management,  and  the  issue  of  demand
management options.
The  consensus  seems  to be  emerging  on  the  first issue  that,  given
the  global  supply  and  demand  prospects  likely  over  the  decade
ahead,  farm  sector  management  problems  in the United States could
well  increase  significantly  and  depend  to  a  far  greater  extent than
in  the  last several  decades  on demand  as well as supply adjustments.
The  second  issue  of  U.S.  demand  management  options  has  re-
ceived  considerably  less  attention.  I  plan to focus  my comments  on
a single, but perhaps the most important, component of U.S.  demand
management  - managing  foreign  demand  for  our  agricultural  pro-
ducts.  I've used an elementary  notion of U.S. and foreign agricultural
supply  and  demand  elasticities  to  put  the  unique  U.S.  problem  of
trade  demand  management  into  perspective.  In  doing  so,  I've  em-
phasized  the  implications  of  these  changing  elasticities  for  the
distribution  across  countries  of the  burden  of  adjusting to  shocks
to the world agricultural system.
Introduction
Over  the  last  decade,  the  world  agricultural  economy  has  under-
gone  a subtle  but critical  shift in its  handling  of the shocks endemic
to  a  system  dependent  on  factors  as  unpredictable  as weather,  the
state  of  more  than  two  dozen  key  macroeconomies  around  the
world,  and  a  myriad  of  conflicting  agricultural  and  trade  policies.
Traditionally,  the  world  agricultural  economy  adjusted  to shocks
- be  they  production  windfalls  or shortfalls  or unforeseen increases
or decreases in consumption - largely through adjustments in supply.
Disruptions  as critical  and  as very different in cause and effect as the
1966  Indian  drought  and  the  1970-71  corn  blight  in  the  United
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world  prices  and,  in turn, through changes  in stocks and production.
Moreover,  these  supply-side  adjustments  were  short  lived;  they
generally  were  immediate  and  their  impact  seldom  extended  be-
yond  6-8  months  until  the  next  season's  crop  was  in  prospect.
Conversely,  the demand  adjustments  sparked  by  these shocks and
a  host  of  other  unexpected  interannual  fluctuations  in  supply  and
demand around  the world were relatively weak, often non-existent -
particularly  if  the  trade-isolationist  Soviet  Union  is  excluded  from
consideration.  Supply adjustments  tended  to  be  three  or  four times
the magnitude  of demand adjustments.
World  agricultural  supply  - defined  to  include  both production
and  stocks  - during  the  1950s,  the  1960s,  and  the  early  1970s
was  generally  far  more  responsive  to  price  changes  than  was  the
world  demand  for  agricultural  products.  This  is,  in  retrospect,  a
logical  state  of  affairs  given  the  considerable  surplus  productive
capacity  available  over  most of the period  and the nature  of agricul-
tural  products.  This  is,  in  retrospect,  a  logical  state  of affairs  given
the  considerable  surplus  productive  capacity  available  over  most
of  the  period  and  the  nature  of  agricultural  - particularly  food -
demand.
More  recently  in  the  middle  and  late  1970s,  however,  shocks  in
the  world  agricultural  economy  have  tended  to  spark  adjustments
spread  more  evenly  across  both  supply  and  demand.  Most  notable
among  the  developments  generating  this  change  in  the  adjustment
process were  what  appear  to be  structural  shifts  in supply.  As  more
of  the  world's  resources  were  used  more  intensively  on  a  regular
basis  and  as  stock  holding  behavior  changed  in response  to  macro-
economic  factors,  supply's  responsiveness  to  changes  in  world
market  prices  weakened  considerably.  Demand  also  seems  to  have
undergone  its  own  transformation  related  to  changing  usage  pat-
terns,  exchange rates, and a number of other macro-economic  factors.
At  first  glance,  these  developments  should  have  signaled  the
transition  toward  a  smoother  functioning  world  market  and,  given
our  trade  linkages,  a  smoother  functioning  U.S.  market.  But  a
closer  look  suggests  that  the  world  market  is  functioning  less
smoothly,  less  efficiently  from  a  U.S.  point  of  view.  The  most
pronounced  changes  in  elasticities  have  been  in  the  United  States.
Tightening  resource  constraints  are  making  U.S.  supply increasingly
less responsive to changes in world market prices. But what is critical,
however,  is  that  the  United  States  remains  by  far  the  most  price
elastic  supplier  in  relative  terms  and  as  a result  will  continue  to be
called on to do the bulk of the world's supply adjusting.
Similarly,  data  for the mid and late 1970s also suggest demand for
agricultural  products  in  the  United  States  has  become  more  price
responsive  while  foreign  demand  has  not  changed  significantly.  As
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responsive  relative  to  demand  elsewhere  in  the  world  than  in  the
1950s  and  1960s.  Perhaps  these  changes  in  supply  and  demand
behavior  are  due not so  much to  underlying  changes  in structure  as
to  changes  in  market  circumstances  that have  moved  us  into  dif-
ferent  areas  of the same  supply and demand curves. The implications
for increases  in  the  already  disproportionately  large  share  of world
adjustments  absorbed  by  the United States, however, are the same in
either case.
This  changing  balance  between  U.S.  and  foreign  supply  and
demand  price  responses  can also  be seen  from  a policy  perspective.
Over the last several  decades,  more  and more countries have isolated
themselves  from the world  market  and  its equilibrating  adjustments
in  their agricultural  supply  and demand.  Their  willingness,  however,
to  dip into the  world  market to insure  stable  food  supplies at home
or to  dispose  of  occasional production  windfalls,  has  allowed  them
to import stability  and export instability. Their isolation has left the
burden of  balancing world  agricultural  supply and demand  to a few
countries  tied directly  to the market.  Adjustment  in these countries
has  traditionally  been  supply-based,  but  during  the  1970s  adjust-
ments  have  impacted  significantly  on their domestic demand as well.
This changing  elasticity balance and policy setting, combined with
the general  outlook for the 1980s discussed earlier at these meetings,
suggests  that  the  United  States  faces  the  possibility  of  bearing  an
even  larger  share  of  more  frequent  and  severe  shocks  to the world
agricultural economy.
Trade Policy Linkages
This  changing  balance  in  the  magnitude  of adjustment  problems
and  the  sources  of adjustment  arose  not so much by chance but as a
result  of  the  agricultural  and  trade  policies  in  effect  in the United
States  and  the  evolving  U.S.  agricultural  relations  with the  rest  of
the  world.  I  will  now  concentrate  on  identifying  how  our  current
trade  policies  evolved, the role they have played in shaping the world
adjustment  process,  and  what  options  they  provide  for minimizing
world  instability  and  the  U.S.  adjustment  burden  in  the  1980s.
A Historical Perspective on U.S. Trade Policy
The  rationale  underlying  our  agricultural  trade  policies  over  the
last  30  years  evolved  immediately  prior to  and  during the  decade
following  World  War  II.  As  a  result,  they reflected  an  overriding
depression-era  concern  with  excess  production  capacity  and  war-
time  demand  for  all  available  output  as  a means  of easing  this  dis-
equilibrium.  By  the start of World  War II,  the American agricultural
sector had undergone  several  decades  of technological  change affect-
ing virtually  every  facet of the farm sector and the structure of farm-
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adopt  this  newly  emerging  technology  quickly  or  be  placed  at  a
serious disadvantage to those who did.
The  result  was  disequilibrium  - too many  resources,  particularly
land  and  labor,  devoted  to  agricultural  production.  The  disequilib-
rium  problem  was  further  aggravated  by the  limited alternative  uses
available  for excess  agricultural resources  and the  slow rate at which
excess  labor  flowed  out  of  agriculture.  Our  war-time  experience
with  exports  as  an  outlet  for  otherwise  surplus  production  tempo-
rarily  eased this disequilibrium  problem.
Given the magnitude of the disequilibrium problem that re-emerged
in  the  late  1940s,  post-war  policy  makers  concluded  that  exports
had  to  be  a  central  component  of  their  policy  package.  Policy
analysts  were  quick  to note that  producing  for a  large  and  growing
export  market  allowed  farmers  to  use  75  to  80  percent  of their
capacity  while  producing  for  the  domestic  market  alone  would
limit  them  to  55  to  60  percent  of  capacity.  Cost  curves,  the  argu-
ment  ran  with  considerable  empirical  support,  were  such  that  unit
costs  were  actually  lower  at  the  higher  capacity  utilization  level.
Given  the  higher  program  costs  that  would  have  been  associated
with  tightening  constraints  on  production  in the  1950s and  1960s,
unit  costs  in  the  broadest  sense  quite  likely  were  lower  with  the
sector  committed  to  producing  for  export.  As  a  result,  exports  -
even  concessional  exports  - were  seen  to  have  a  low,  possibly
negative opportunity cost and sizeable benefits in terms of payments,
farm income, and federal budget.
This  sense  of  the  beneficial  impact  of  agricultural  exports  was
behind  our post-war  stance  in favor of expanding  world  agricultural
trade  through  liberalization,  particularly in  grains and other products
in  abundant  supply  in  the  United  States.  It also  underlay  the  in-
ternational  agricultural  trade  programs  developed  over  the  first  20
years  of  the  post-war  period  including  the  export  promotion  and
export  subsidy  programs  aimed  at  fostering  long  term  growth  in
commercial  trade  and,  by  the  mid  1950s,  concessional  trade  pro-
grams  as  well.  This  same  notion  of the  positive  impact  of exports
also  underlay  our  willingness  to  tie  our  domestic  market  directly
to  the  world  market  and  to absorb more  of the  world's interannual
fluctuations  in supply and demand.
These  programs  aimed  at  expanding  exports  were  quite  success-
ful;  over  the  1950  to  1970  period,  U.S.  exports  expanded  an  aver-
age  of  5  to  6  percent  per  year  while  gains  in  productive  capacity
averaged  2  percent  and gains  in domestic  usage  averaged 1.5-1.7 per-
cent.  Foreign  dependence  on the United States as a source  of supply
grew  from  2  percent  in the  1950s to  7-9 percent  in  the  early  1970s
despite  a  strong move  toward  food self-sufficiency  in the European
Community,  the  world's  largest  market  for  agricultural  products.
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U.S.  agricultural  and trade policies  in the post-war period pivoted
on  the  government's  willingness  to  accumulate  surpluses  as  stocks
during one period  and to  draw down these surpluses later, with little
if  any  compensation  for  storage  cost,  to meet  supply  or  demand
fluctuations virtually  anywhere in the world.
As  a  result,  foreign  countries  were  able  to  minimize  the  stocks
they held.  As stocks  became  increasingly concentrated  in the United
States,  many  foreign  countries'  capacity  to  adjust  supply  to  com-
pensate  for  shocks  either  at home  or  abroad dwindled.  Our excess
productive  capacity,  and  our  policy  commitment  to use  it to com-
pensate  for virtually  any  shock to the world system, also encouraged
many  countries  - particularly  developing  countries  - to forego  the
investments  in  agriculture  necessary  to keep their sectors responsive.
In  short,  much  of  the  rest  of  the  world  was  quick to recognize
the  United  States  as  a reliable  - possibly  even  a captive  - residual
supplier  in  a buyer's  rather than  a seller's  market.  U.S.  policies  also
had  a  less  direct  impact  on  the  structure  of  foreign  agricultural
demand.  Our  trade  programs  - export  promotion,  commercial
credit,  donation,  and concessional sale programs - and possibly even
our  trade  liberalization  stance  tended  to  enhance  demand  abroad.
By  removing  or minimizing  much  of the rest  of the world's  need
to  adjust  their  agricultural  supply  or  demand  to  compensate  for
foreign and  in some  cases  even  indigenous  shocks,  we  allowed  them
to  forego  developing  the  admittedly  costly  capacity  to  adjust.
The  increasingly  protectionist  trade  policies  put  into  effect  over
the  1950s  and  1960s  in  a  number  of  countries  further  weakened
their  demand  and  supply  response  capacity  by  institutionalizing
stability,  often  via  complex  systems  of  trade  restrictions  and  vari-
able  levies.  This  drift  toward  protectionism  was  facilitated  by  our
commitment  to  export  as  much  as  possible  whenever  possible.
Trade Policies to Ease the U.S.'s Adjustment
Burden in the 1980s
By  whatever  combination  of  circumstances,  the  United  States
as  the  start  of the 1980s  is  faced  with  bearing  a disproportionately
large  share  of  the  world  market's  adjustment  burden.  Moreover,  if
the  supply-demand  balance  for  the  1980s  oscillates  widely,  the
world  adjustment  burden  will  increase  significantly.  Equally  im-
portant, the return  on producing  for export is  changing dramatically
with  the  disappearance  of  our  excess  capacity.  Growth  in  foreign
demand  for  our  products  in  the  1970s  pushed  capacity  utilization
up  from  80-85 percent  to  90-95 percent  - on  occasion  to 100 per-
cent.  Exports  in  the  volume  likely  in  the  1980s  will  tend  to raise
the  opportunity costs  of producing  for export significantly,  both in
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of  food  price  inflation,  resource  use,  and  environmental  stress.
Much  as  our  trade  policies  helped  work the  United  States  into
this  position,  a  realignment  of  our  trade policies  should  be  able to
ease  the  U.S.'s  adjustment  burden  by increasing  the price  elasticity
of agricultural  supply  and demand  abroad - or at least by increasing
the  return  on  our  trade  with  the  world  market.  Three  policy  areas
appear  likely  to  be  critical  - our  policy  on  trade  liberalization  as
it  affects  the  functioning  of  the  world  market,  our  policy  on  re-
serves  as  it  affects  other  countries'  capacity  to  bear  more  of their
own  adjustment  burdens  indigenously,  and  our  position  on  aid.
I'll deal with each of these in turn in greater detail.
Liberalizing World Agricultural Trade
The  changing  setting  of  the  1980s  will  put  a  premium  on  the
effective  U.S.  use  of  trade  policy  to  liberalize  world  agricultural
trade.  Agricultural  trade  liberalization  has  been a longstanding  U.S.
goal  but  the  underlying  rationale  for  this  stance  and  the  benefits
it can  hope to realize  from liberalization  have changed dramatically.
Past  liberalization  effects  reflected,  in  large  part,  a  concern  with
expanding  trade  by  easing  the  foreign  tariff  and non-tariff  barriers
affecting U.S. agricultural exports.
Liberalization  in the 1980s has become  first and foremost a means
of  stabilizing  the  world  market,  of  strengthening  the  linkages  be-
tween national markets  and the  world market - in turn allowing the
world  market  to  adjust more  effectively.  From  a  U.S.  prospective,
liberalizing  trade  will increase  the number  of adjusters  in the world
market,  increase their  sensitivity  and responsiveness  to the need  for
adjustment,  and  decrease  our  adjustment  burden.  While  the  rest
of  the  world's  sensitivity  to  shocks  and  capacity  to  adjust  - i.e.,
their  supply  and  demand responsiveness  - ultimately  depends  on a
range  of  institutional  and  resource  endorsement  factors,  closer
linkage to the world market is a critical first step.
International  Reserves
Much  of  the  U.S.  ability  and  willingness  to  absorb  shocks  in
the  1950s and  1960s was  due  to our position in world stock holding
and  management.  Greater  foreign  responsiveness  to  shocks  to  the
system  in  the  1980s  will  depend  not  only  on  liberalizing  trade  to
insure  that world  market  price  signals  are transmitted  to indigenous
producers  and  consumers  but  also  on  insuring  that more countries
have the stocks with which to make short term adjustments.
The results  of the studies done over the last three years to support
the  reserve  discussions  at  the  International  Wheat  Council  dem-
onstrate  that the potential  exists  for balancing  expanded  and better
managed  stocks off against  much  of the increased market variability
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grain  market  over  the  last several  years  suggest  that we  are  shifting
from  a  buyer's  to  a  seller's  market  and  that  larger  stocks  will  be
necessary  if the  world  market  is  to  function  smoothly  even  in the
absence of increased variability.
What  is  needed  in  any  case,  however,  to maximize the adjustment
value  of stocks  in  a world where the potential for production adjust-
ments  is  decreasing  is  better  managed  as  well  as  bigger  stocks.  In
short,  our  vested  interest  in  an  international  system  of  reserves
is  stronger  now  than  ever  before  and  should  not  be  dictated  by
short-sighted  concern  with  the  timing  of  stock  buildups.  Even  if
an  international  effort  to  establish  an  expanded,  better-managed
international  reserve  should  fail,  an  expanded,  better-managed
national  U.S.  reserve  will  be  in our vested  interest  to aid  in meeting
our  commercial  and  concessional  trade  commitments  and  in  min-
imizing  the impact of imported  instability  on  our domestic  market.
Expanding Food Aid Responsibility
Also of concern if the  United  States is to avoid  assuming an even
larger  adjustment  burden  in  the  1980s  is a more equitable  division
of  responsibilities  for  meeting  the  aid  needs  of the  low  income
countries.  Common  to  these  trade  liberalization,  international
reserve,  and  food  aid  concerns  is the United States' interest in - and
our  increasingly  strong  position  to  insist  on  - a  more  equitable
sharing of the costs and benefits of world trade.
Alternatives
If  these  initiatives  fail,  a  frank  U.S.  reappraisal  of  what  can  be
done  to  minimize  the  costs  and  maximize  the  benefits  associated
with our linkages to the world market is in order.
On  the  cost  minimization  side,  exploration  of  the  marketing
alternatives  used  by  other  exporters and most importers  to weaken
the  price  linkage  between  their  domestic  market  and  the  world
market  - and  in turn their adjustment  burden - is a place to  start.
Included  among  these  marketing  alternatives  is  the  creation  of
export  marketing  boards  or an expanded  system  of long term  trade
agreements  linked to tighten export volume controls.
At  issue  here  is  the  prioritization  of demand  for  our products
here  and  abroad.  Heretofore,  temporary  shifts  in  import  demand
overseas  due  to weather  or policy  factors  or fluctuations  in produc-
tion  in  the  United  States  forced  U.S.  policymakers  to  prioritize
what  proved  to be temporarily conflicting trade policy and domestic
agricultural  policy  goals.  This  prioritization  involved  short  term
trade-offs  between  foreign  and  domestic  consumers  but no change
in  our  basic  longer  term  commitment  to maximize export  volume.
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1980s  will  force  us  to  take  a  fundamental  look  at  what  level  of
exports  is  good  for  the  economy  as  a  whole  in the short-term  and
what  rate  of  growth  in  exports  is  advisable  over  the  longer  run.
On  the  benefit  maximization  side,  U.S.  policy  initiatives  will
need to  concentrate  on  increasing  the return  on  our participation  in
a  volatile  world  market.  The  marketing  boards  used  by  many  coun-
tries  to minimize  disruptions  and  to target export volume  levels can
also  be  used  to  insure  that  the  return  on  export  sales  covers  the
full  cost  of  producing  and  marketing  agricultural  products.  While
export  promotion  programs  may  appear  initially  to be  superfluous
in  the 1980s,  they could  well  play  a critical  role  in  focusing  export
growth  on  the  products  that tax our  resource  base  and  worsen  our
food  price  inflation  problems  least.  They  can  also  be  used  to target
exports  to  the  more  stable  rather  than  the  most  volatile  markets.
Conclusions
In  summary,  a  number  of  factors  as  different  as  resource  con-
straints,  exchange  rate  fluctuations,  and  trade  policy  decisions
combined  over  the  1970s  to  change  the  way  the  world  market  ad-
justs  to  system  disruptions.  Traditionally,  adjustments  have  been
largely  supply-based  and  have  had  little,  if  any,  demand  impact.
Given  the  supply  and  demand  developments  likely  over  the  decade
ahead,  adjustments  are  apt to be larger and to be spread more widely
across  both  demand  and  supply.  Moreover,  given  changing  supply
and  demand  elasticies  in  the  United States and the rest of the world,
the  United States  will  quite likely  continue  to  be  the world's  major
adjustor.
Without  concentrated  policy  action  in  the  United  States,  much
of  this  adjustment  burden  will  spill  over into  demand  disruption  -
disruption  of  domestic  demand  rather  than  foreign  demand  for
our  products.  Much  as the trade  policy  decisions  of the last decade
got  the  United  States  into  this  state  of affairs,  trade  policies  can
help  generate  a  more  equitable  sharing  across  countries  of  the  sig-
nificantly heavier adjustment burdens ahead.
Views  expressed  in  this paper  are those  of the author  and  do not
necessarily  reflect  those  of the Economic  Research Service,  U.S.D.A.
126